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The collapse of a ﬁlling occurred due to heavy rain in Higashi-Hiroshima City's Shiwa District at about 5:30 am July 25th, 2009. The ﬁlling
was made of surplus soils, and it contained a mass of water supplied from rainfall and ground water ﬂow of a permeable layer at the bottom of the
ﬁlling. The collapsed soil ﬂowed down and destroyed a house. In this paper, the cause of this disaster is discussed. The site of the disaster was
used as the dumping site of surplus soils, after several changes of ground formation. The history of the geographical change was reconstructed by
the image processing of old map, aerial photographs, result of 3-dimentional laser survey carried out after collapse and the measurement of
thickness of collapsed soil by dynamic cone penetration test. According to the result of processing, the shape and the size of the ﬁlling before
collapse was reconstructed. The relationship between the rainfall and the groundwater in the river sediments layer over which the ﬁlling was
constructed was determined. A stability analysis of the ﬁlling was conducted considering the rise of the groundwater level in the ﬁlling and the
laboratory measured strength parameters. The results of the stability analysis showed that the collapse would have taken place when the
groundwater level rose by about 9 m due to the supply of groundwater through the river sediments layer.
& 2014 The Japanese Geotechnical Society. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Landslides and mudﬂows are frequent natural disasters in
Japan which almost always occur after heavy seasonal rainfall,10.1016/j.sandf.2014.06.005
4 The Japanese Geotechnical Society. Production and hosting by
g author.
ss: ttuchida@hiroshima-u.ac.jp (T. Tsuchida).
der responsibility of The Japanese Geotechnical Society.causing the loss of life and property. Kitamura and Sako (2010)
published a state-of-the-art review of research work on slope
failure during the last 50 years. In Hiroshima Prefecture, as
many as 32,000 natural slopes are considered to be susceptible
to landslide and mudﬂow disasters. This is the highest number
of the potentially dangerous among the 47 prefectures in Japan
(Hiroshima Prefecture, 2010). Landslide disasters occur frequently
during seasonal rainfalls in the western part of Japan's main island,Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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heavily weathered granite, called “Masado” (Aboshi and Sokobiki,
1972). The occurrence of these failures is mainly due to the rise of
the groundwater table in the slopes or the loss of the inbound shear
strength of the Masado soils due to intense and continuous rainfall
during a heavy rainy season (Murata and Moriwaki, 1990). On
June 29, 1999, a severe landslide and mudﬂow disaster in
Hiroshima Prefecture resulted in the deaths of 36 people (Sasaki
et al., 2001; Nakai et al., 2006). After the “6.29 disaster”,
Hiroshima Prefectural Government installed an on-line rainfall
measurement system which compiles information from 277
measurement stations in the prefecture. On September 7, 2005,
due to the concentrated heavy rainfall in the passage of Typhoon
No. 14, an embankment of Sanyo Expressway in Iwakuni City
neighboring to Hiroshima Prefecture suddenly failed, resulting in
the deaths of 3 residents living in 2 houses near the embankment
(Murata, et al., 2009). Slope disasters in Yamaguchi Prefecture and
Kyushu area caused by Typhoon No. 14 in 2005 were reported in
detail by Sehara et al. (2006) and Sezaki et al. (2006), respectively.
On July 16th, 2010, a heavy rainstorm of 173 mm (at Oto
precipitation station) suddenly hit Shobara city, Hiroshima Pre-
fecture, causing landslides and mud ﬂows at over 200 sites in a
narrow mountainous area of 4 km (Hanaoka et al., 2012). The
frequent occurrence of landslide disasters illustrates the importance
of studying disaster prevention measures. In eastern Japan, natural
slope failures are also frequently induced by heavy rainfall: the
Niigata 13th of July, 2004 disaster is one such example (Toyota
et al., 2006; Shibuya et al., 2007; JGS, 2011). Recently, natural
slopes are being closely monitored for the purpose of disaster
prevention (Jeng and Lin, 2011; Rahardjo et al., 2011; Huang
et al., 2012). Case studies of actual natural slope failure will prove
useful in this approach.
On July 24th, 2009, an artiﬁcial ﬁlling which was con-
structed in a mountainous area in Higashi-Hiroshima city inFig. 1. Location of disaster and photograph after disasHiroshima prefecture suddenly collapsed after heavy rainfall
that lasted for 9 h. The ﬂow of ﬂuidized sediment reached a
house located 300 m downstream from the ﬁll and destroyed it
completely, burying two persons, one of whom died and one
of whom was rescued several hours after the incident. The site
of the collapsed ﬁll had been unitized as a disposal site for
construction surplus soil by a company since 2004. According
to the report of Japanese government (Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2010), the total volume
of surplus soil discharged from construction work in 2008 was
about 141 million m3 and about 70% of the surplus soil was
brought to disposal sites inland. As Hiroshima prefecture has
little habitable area for its population, most of the disposal sites
of surplus soil are located in mountainous areas. The company
managing the collapsed ﬁll had been ﬁlling a valley with
surplus soil which was accepted for a charge per volume. The
disaster was the ﬁrst case in Japan that the disposal site for
surplus soil collapsed due to the heavy rainfall and resulted in
a fatality. After the disaster, the causes of the collapse were
studied by a team at Hiroshima University and Fukken Corp
(Kano et al., 2011). The results of the study are reported in this
paper, along with a discussion about the considerations on
countermeasures required to prevent similar disasters in dis-
posal ﬁelds of surplus soil in future.2. Overviews of the disaster and ﬁeld investigation
According to the recorded rainfall in Hiroshima Prefecture,
the prefecture received an accumulated rainfall of 151 mm
over the period of 20 h from 18:00 on the 24th July, 2009, due
to the inﬂuence of the active front of seasonal rain. It was
continuous rainfall with a maximum intensity of 32 mm/h. Due
to this rainfall, at around 5:30 on July 25th, a collapse occurredter (Higashi Hiroshima Shiwa-cho Uchi District).
Photo 1. Conditions of collapsed and ﬂowed soil in the vicinity of the disaster-
affected house.
Photo 2. Conditions at the disaster-affected house.
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Top of the fill
T. Tsuchida et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 621–638 623at a surplus soil disposal site in the Shiwa District in Higashi
Hiroshima and the ﬂuidized sediment ﬂowed downstream,
leading to a disaster that left one house completely destroyed,
one person dead and one person injured. The site of the
collapse and the area of sediment ﬂow is shown in Fig. 1. The
district of Shiwacho in Higashi-Hiroshima city is a mountai-
nous region. The location of the disaster is in a small area
along a mountain stream etched into the northeast facing slope
of a mountain terrain extending from southwest to northeast.
A ﬁlling was formed using surplus soil such that it would ﬁll a
valley with the mountain stream. As will be described later, the
ﬁlling was built up in several stages and was estimated to have
reached a maximum height of around 30 m from the base.
From the geological map of the site, the base rock of the site
was located at the boundary between the granite and rhyolite
area; the granite area was downstream, and the rhyolite area
was upstream. According to ﬁeld investigations, most of the
surface soils around the valley and the ﬁlled surplus soil
seemed to be Masado, heavily weathered granite.
The location map of the surveyed areas and photographs are
shown in Fig. 2. A site reconnaissance was conducted on July
27th and August 7th, 2009, and the information obtained
relating to the disaster was as follows. The downstream
conditions of the collapsed and ﬂowed soils in the vicinity
of the destroyed house are shown in Photo 1. Even when a
survey was conducted on August 7th, almost 2 weeks after the
disaster struck, the ground was muddy underfoot to the extent
that the feet would sink. It can therefore be concluded that the
collapsed sediment deposit had extremely high ﬂuidity. The
sediment traveled a horizontal distance of approximately
500 m from the soil disposal site to the house and the nearby
street (an elevation of approximately 100 m). The equivalent
coefﬁcient of friction (Korner, 1980), which is the horizontal
distance traveled by the soil divided by the difference in
elevation, is 0.20 and it is thought that the sediment ﬂow
phenomenon during this event was mudﬂow. However, the
observed sediments did not contain any large stones, which
can often be seen in the disaster areas of mudﬂows where
granite and rhyolite are common.Collapse 
occurrence
Crushed house
Catchment area
Forest Road
SanjoRiver
Retaining 
wall
Fig. 2. Location map of where the reconnaissance photographs were taken.
River bed deposits
Photo 3. Conditions downstream and riverbed deposits.The condition of the disaster-affected house is shown in
Photo 2. The house was completely destroyed by the soil that
ﬂowed downwards and the debris from the house was spread
around the surrounding area. Photo 3 shows the layer of
riverbed deposits downstream from the landslide ﬁlls. This
layer is due to mudﬂows that had occurred in the past and it
was found that it is almost continuously present. Even after the
T. Tsuchida et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 621–638624landslide occurred, water ﬂowed abundantly in the layer and it
is thought that, before and after the disaster struck, a large
amount of groundwater was supplied from this layer.
Photo 4 shows the conditions at the top of the ﬁll after
collapse. Spring water was still ﬂowing out from several
locations on the side of the slope. This indicates that, as
mentioned previously, a large amount of ground water was
supplied to the inside of the ﬁll through the layer of river bed
deposits that were under the ﬁll. Photo 5 shows the right side
bank of the landslide. Although 2 weeks had passed since the
collapse, spring water was discernible in the vicinity of the
surveying pole. This spring water was also close to the location
of the layer of river bed deposits, which was veriﬁed by the
bore hole logs at the top of landslide ﬁll, as will be discussed
later. It is highly likely that the spring was supplied by this
layer. It was observed that the collapsed sediment deposit
included soils of different colors from the surrounding ground.
Within these soils were not only natural materials, such as
gravel and sand, but also man-made debris, such as fragments
of asphalt and offcuts of vinyl.Photo 4. Conditions at the top of landslide ﬁll (taken July 27th, red circles
shows the springs). (For interpretation of the references to color in this photo
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Photo 5. Conditions on the right side bank of landslide ﬁll (taken August 7th,
red arrow shows a spring). (For interpretation of the references to color in this
photo legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)From the observations of the collapse soils, it seemed that a
large part of the sediments that had collapsed was surplus soil
which was ﬁlled by the company since 2004 and that, after the
surplus soil had collapsed, it ﬂowed downwards scraping
against the side of the slope and incorporating soil from the
ground along the way.
A ﬁeld investigation and an interview with the company
responsible for the ﬁll since 2004 and the governmental agency
on erosion control, it was known that there were almost no
records for the ﬁlling in this valley except for the aerial
photographs taken in 1981. In 1981, the upper part of the
collapsed ﬁll were already constructed for the purpose of the
forest road construction. From 1981 to 2009, two major ﬁlling
works were made for the construction of a waste disposal site
and for a ﬁlling for surplus soil. In this study, to ﬁnd the reason
of this disaster, the topographic changes were estimated using
various approaches.
3. Estimation of past topographic change of disaster area
3.1. Topography and geomorphology of the area
As shown in Fig. 2, the upstream catchment area of the
valley where the ﬁlling is located is 33,200 m2, and the
topography shows that the rain that falls upstream gathers
easily in the valley where the collapse occurred. Furthermore,
near the top of the ﬁlling, there is a forest road crossing the
mountain stream and it is thought that rainfall water gathered
easily into the valley through the forest road.
Approximately 100 m downstream from the collapsed ﬁll-
ing, the valley becomes wider and a gently sloping topography
with a gradient of around 101. It is thought that this topography
is formed by the accumulation of colluvium deposits and
mudﬂow deposits from years back and is widely distributed in
the foothills of surrounding areas, including this area.
According to the 1/50,000 geological survey map (Takagi
and Mizuno, 1999), “Kaita quadrangle”, the bedrock geology
of this area is granite or rhyolite, upon which unconsolidated
sediment is distributed. In the lower reaches, a Hiroshima
graphite bedrock geology is distributed and in the upper
reaches a rhyolite Takeda bedrock geology is distributed and
these are fault-contacted. Small rocks of ﬁne-grained granite
have also been presented in the vicinity of the geological
boundary. A distribution of ancient talus (mudﬂow) sediments
and a substantial upper terrace layer was recorded on top of the
bedrock and the aforementioned gentle topography is thought
to correspond to these distribution ranges. Furthermore, the
river bed deposits are thought to have been distributed so that
they ﬁll the valley channel, but some of these deposits were
washed away together with the downward ﬂowing sediment.
During the site reconnaissance, the distribution of talus and
mudﬂow sediments with a well-compacted matrix were
apparent in the locations scoured by the discharged sediment
and following that the water ﬂow, as shown in Photo 6, and
these are thought to correspond to the ancient talus. Further-
more, deposits that contained rounded gravel, thought to be the
substantial upper terrace layer, were also veriﬁed in parts.
Photo 6. Talus ﬂushed down by scouring of the downstream portion .
Photo 7. Rubber sheet laid for waste disposal site (June 1993) .
T. Tsuchida et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 621–638 625The ﬁlling was made up of sediment that contains ﬁne-grain
fractions, and the sediment deposits contained an extremely
large amount of water after the collapse. The top of the ﬁlling,
which corresponds to the head of the collapse, was relatively
well-compacted, resulting in a steep slope.
3.2. Change of landscape of the disaster site
The site was used as a surplus soil disposal site, but it was
designed as an industrial waste disposal facility, which was
abandoned and unused after construction. The prefectural
government authorized the installation of an industrial waste
disposal facility which a company applied for in 1992. From
1992 to 1994, the company constructed the retaining wall and
retention pond, and they also excavated the slope at the
upstream of the retaining wall and laid the impermeable rubber
sheets. Photo 7 taken in 1993 shows that the rubber sheets
were laid in an area from the retaining wall to 60 m upstream
of the retaining wall. A sand layer cover was laid on the rubber
sheets. In 1994, the government notiﬁed the company that, in
the results of the survey prior to use of the facility, the facility
did not satisfy the technical standards and, as a result, the
company abandoned the use and the ofﬁcial notiﬁcation of
abolishment was submitted on March 31, 1995. Since 2004,the site was used as a surplus soil disposal site by another
company and ﬁlling had been made and extended such that it
would ﬁll the valley channel.
3.3. Restoration of the land-forming process from the aerial
photographs and measurement results
This disaster was a collapse of a ﬁlling in a surplus soil
disposal site in a mountainous area. In order to investigate the
cause of the collapse, it was necessary to know the topography
conditions prior to the collapse, including the size and shape of
the ﬁlling. However, the site of the disaster has been subject to
several topographic changes due to past construction work,
including a forest road and industrial waste disposal facility,
since 1980s. Furthermore, as the surplus soil had been
transported to the top of the ﬁlling by a forest road and was
disposed by piling it in the bottom of the valley from the top of
the ﬁlling since 2004, the size and shape of the ﬁlling changed
with time. Although some data on the time history of accepted
surplus soil was obtained by an interview with the manager of
the company, they did not sufﬁciently match the volume of
collapsed soil which was estimated from the ﬁeld investigation
after the collapse. To restore the land-forming process, a
comparative study was carried out using the laser survey
results after the collapse, the survey drawing submitted to the
government in 1992, and the aerial photographs of the site
after 1992, and a 3-dimensional image processing technique
was used to display the topography changes of the collapsed
ﬁlling with time. It is known that there is a margin of error of
several meters concerning the altitude of mountainous areas
taken from aerial photographs. The data on the collapsed soil
which was taken from the aerial photographs was compared
with the thickness of the collapsed soil measured by 3D laser
survey and the lightweight dynamic cone penetration test
(LWDCPT) mentioned later. The absolute values for the
altitude were adjusted for the both data to ﬁt together.
The following survey maps and the aerial photographs were
used for the processing:(1) Digital mapping made in this study using the aerial
photographs from 1981.(2) The plan view and cross section from the application
documentation for industrial waste disposal facility (1992).(3) Digital mapping made by Higashi Hiroshima City Govern-
ment based on aerial photographs from 1999.(4) Digital mapping made in this study using the aerial
photographs from 2005.(5) Digital mapping made in this study using the aerial
photographs from 2008.(6) Results of the laser survey conducted after the collapse
from 2009.Figs. 3 and 4 are the topographic maps for 1992 and 1999,
respectively. The changes in the topography during this period
were mainly due to the development of the industrial waste
disposal facility, which involved construction work such as
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Fig. 3. Plan view from 1992 documentation related to the industrial waste
disposal facility (superimposed with the aerial photograph from 1981).
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Fig. 4. Superimposition map with the aerial photograph from 1999.
N0.9
N0.8
N0.5
N0.4
N0.3
N0.7
N0.6
N0.2
N0.1
B.P.
Based on aerial photograph 
from 2005
Fig. 5. Superimposition map with the aerial photograph from 2005.
N0.9
N0.8
N0.5
N0.4
N0.3
N0.7
N0.6
N0.2
N0.1
B.P.
Based on aerial photograph 
from 2008
Fig. 6. Superimposition map with the aerial photograph from 2008. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 7. Superimposition map with the aerial photograph after the collapse.
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in Figs. 3 and 4 was dug deeper and excavation was carried out
on both banks. An access road to the facility was built into the
side of the left bank and it is assumed that at this point an
embankment was formed in part of the valley upstream of the
vicinity of observation point No. 4.
The topographic changes from 1999 to 2005 can be under-
stood from Figs. 4 and 5. The main changes at this point were
due to the ﬁlling at the head of the valley and it is thought that
this was constructed as a result of the surplus soil disposal since
2004. From 2005 (Fig. 5) to 2008 (Fig. 6), the ﬁlling of surplus
soil was carried out further and as the slope became higher, the
edge of the ﬁlling reached slightly downstream. Furthermore, an
outﬂow of sediment to the bottom of the slope (upstream from
the retaining wall) was noted and this is thought to be due to
erosion and small collapses caused by rainfall.
The yellow contour drawn in the aerial photograph from
2008 in Fig. 6 is a superimposed traced contour of the
collapsed sediment deposit from the aerial photograph taken
after the collapse in 2009 (Fig. 7). It can be seen from this
ﬁgure that at both sides of the surface of collapse include the
areas where vegetation is thick.Fig. 8 shows the estimated topographical transition of the
site from 1992 to after the collapse as birds-eye view in a west
to east direction. After 1999, the rubber sheets which were laid
on the surface and at the bottom of the valley are visible. Using
the results, the volume of collapsed soil was calculated, and the
Fig. 8. Estimated topographical transition of the site.
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Fig. 9. Change of cross section of collapsed slope.
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from the area and the thickness of collapsed soil, which was
measured by the ﬁeld investigation as mentioned later. Finally
it was concluded that the total volume of collapsed soil was
approximately 7000 m3.
Fig. 9 is a superimposition of a series of proﬁles created
based on Figs. 3–7. As can be seen from Fig. 8, the collapsed
soil was mainly due to the collapse of the ﬁlling constructed
from surplus soil brought in after 2004, containing part of the
ﬁlling constructed between 1992 and 1999 and part of the
natural slope. It was known that the embankment before 1992
did not collapse. This information is crucial when considering
the cause of the collapse.It can be concluded that the image processing technique
using the past and after-collapse survey maps and the aerial
photographs are useful to estimate the initial condition of
collapsed slopes for engineers and it was also useful when
presenting an explanation of the disaster to the public.
4. Geotechnical investigation
4.1. In-situ penetration test by LWDCPT
The authors have been developing a method to estimate the
in-situ shear strength of natural slopes using the penetration
resistance obtained by Lightweight dynamic cone penetration
T. Tsuchida et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 621–638628test (LWDCPT) (Athapaththu et al., 2007a, 2007b; Tsuchida
et al., 2011). To determine the thickness and volume of
collapsed soil by discriminating the collapsed soil from the
original ground, a series of LWDCPT was carried out at the
site of embankment after collapse, the sites of deposits of
collapsed soil and the site without deposits near the slope. The
test dates were from August 29th to September 4th in 2009,
about 40 days after the collapse.
LWDCPT is a dynamic cone penetrometer with variable
energy, it was designed and developed in France during the
1990s (Langton, 1999). The schematic view of the LWDCPT
is shown in Fig.10. It weighs 20 kg and can be operated by one
person at almost any location to a depth of 6 m. It mainly
consists of an anvil with a strain gauge bridge, a central
acquisition unit, and a dialog terminal. The hammer is a
rebound-type hammer and weighs 1.73 kg. The stainless steelRod
Cone 
Hammer with 
no rebound
(striking mass)
Central Acquisition 
Unit
Scale
Head
Dialogue
Terminal
Cable
(anvil)
Fig.10. Lightweight dynamic cone penetration test.
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The blow from the hammer to the anvil provides energy
input, and a unique microprocessor records the speed of the
hammer and the depth of penetration. The dynamic cone
resistance (qd) is automatically calculated from the modiﬁed
form of the Dutch Formula as (Cassan, 1988)
qd ¼
1
A
ð1=2ÞMV2
1þðP=MÞ
1
x
ð1Þ
wherelap
 co
n-l
m
-2.5
m-
.5
oll
ntsx¼penetration due to one blow of the hammer (m),
A¼area of the cone (m2),
M¼mass of the striking part (hammer) (kg)
P¼mass of the struck part (head, cone, and rod) (kg)
V¼speed of the hammer impact (m/s)With every 50 cm penetration, another stainless steel rod
was joined to the rod, and the penetration test was continued to
the depth where measured value of qd is greater than 10 MPa
for the third time in a row. LWDCPT were carried out at 25
points, including at the embankment of the surplus soil after
collapse, at the area of the deposits of collapsed and
transported soil and at an area without any collapsed soil. To
carry out a direct shear test, disturbed soil samples were taken
at the slope after the collapse. Fig. 11 shows the measurement
points of LWDCPT and the points of soil sampling.
Fig. 12(a) shows the results of LWDCPT carried out at point
m-9, the site of embankment after collapse, m-3.5, the site of
deposit of collapsed soil, r-m-2, the site in the trees where the
collapsed soil deposited, and r-12, the site 50 m far from these soil
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-2
-10
m-2
m-4
m-5
m-6
m-7
m-8
3.5
m-3
m-1
apse m-9
0                 50m
Retaining 
wall
Boringand
groundwater 
observation
of LWDCT.
00.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
D
ep
th
 (m
) 
Point m-9 
3m down from the top 
of collapse
Embankment
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bed rock
Point  m-3-5
37.5m from 
retaining wall
Soil from collapsed 
embankment
Impearmeable sheet and
the covering soils
Deposits befor the 
collapse
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
D
ep
th
  (
m
)
Point r-m-2
35m from retainig wall
Bed rock
Soil from collapsed 
embankment
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bed rock
Point r-12
50m from retaining wall
Soil from collapsed 
embankment
D
ep
th
  (
m
)
D
ep
th
 (m
) 
Fig. 12. Penetration resistance by LWDCPT with depth, (a) Point m-9 and (b) Point m-3.5.
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the collapse, the degree of saturation was 60–80%. As shown
in Fig. 12(a), the penetration resistances qd of embankment
after the collapse were larger than 2 MPa and increased with
depth, which means the embankment had sufﬁcient shear
strength before the rainfall.
As shown in Fig. 12(b), there was a rubber sheet at the 1.7 m
and a covering sand on the rubber sheet at the 1.4 m depth of
point m-3–5. There were deposits before collapse on the covering
layer by about 70 cm and the soil from collapsed embankment
remained on the deposits before collapse. Before the geotechnical
investigation of the site, the possibility that the rubber sheets,
which were laid for the unused waste disposal site, were related to
the landslide or the ﬂow of collapsed soil was discussed. Fig. 12
(b) showed that the sliding or the movement of collapsed soil did
not take place at the surface of the rubber sheet, and that the
rubber sheets were not related to the disaster.Looking at Fig. 12(b)–(d), the qd showed the constant value
of 0.2–1.0 MPa from the surface to the 60 cm depth, and qd
was clearly larger in the depth more than 60 cm. The surface
layer of 60 cm thickness seemed to be the deposits of soil from
collapsed embankment. The value of qd showed variation
because the qd becomes larger when the cone hits the gravel or
root in the ground. However, the minimum values of qd did not
considerably vary and were 0.1–0.3 MPa, and showed no
relationship with the depth. The discrimination of the depos-
ited layer of collapsed soil was carried out using the relation-
ship between the minimum of qd and the depth. Table 1 shows
the thickness of the layer of collapsed soil deposits at each
measurement points. As shown in the table, the maximum
thickness was 1.6 m above the enclosing bund and 0.81 m
below the enclosing bund. The estimated thickness of the
collapsed soil in Table 1 was used to estimate the volume of
collapsed soil together with the image processing results.
Table 1
Estimated thickness of collapsed soil.
Upper side from retaining wall Lower side from retaining wall
Testing point Estimated thickness of collapsed soil (m) Testing point Estimated thickness of collapsed soil (m)
m-6 1.2 m-10 0.39
m-5 0.80 r-m-3 0.81
m-4 1.12 f-6 0.45
m-3.5 0.85 r-11 0.38
m-3 1.25 r-m-2 0.79
m-2.5 0.81 r-12 0.57
m-2 1.60 r-m-1 0.28
m-1.5 0.85 l-13 0.61
m-1 1.32 r-1 0.17
Table 2
Soil properties.
Soil sample A B
Color Black Brown
Density of soil particle, ρs (g/cm
3) 2.545 2.666
Water content, w (%) 21.7 15.2
Wet density, ρt (g/cm
3) 1.846 1.871
Dry density, ρd (g/cm
3) 1.519 1.625
Degree of saturation, Sr (%) 81.3 63.2
Fine content, Fc (%) 28.1 27.0
Fig. 13. Grain size accumulation curve of soil samples, (c) Point r-m-2 and (d)
Point r-12.
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As mentioned above, the embankment made by construction
surplus soil collapsed and the collapsed soil was transported
along the valley. The disturbed soil samples of the embank-
ment which remained after the collapse were taken from a
depth of 30 cm at the points m-6, m-7 and m-9 in Fig. 11.
According to the observation of soil samples, the embankment
was constructed by two kinds of soil, black soil (Sample A)
and brown soil (Sample B). The physical properties of the soil
samples were listed in Table 2. The gradation curves of the
samples were shown in Fig. 13, where the gradation char-
acteristics of both soil samples was similar and the ﬁne
contents were 27–28%.
4.3. Measurement of strength parameters of collapsed soil
A direct shear test of the sampled soils were carried out after
adjusting the void ratio to that of the in-situ average value and
the degree of saturation of 70%. All tests were conducted at
39.2, 78.4 and 156.8 kPa normal stresses. Shearing was
achieved by horizontally displacing the bottom half of the
direct shear box relative to the top half at a constant shear
displacement rate of 0.2 mm/min, as described in JGS 0561-
200 (Japanese Geotechnical Society, 2000). Although the
drainage was permitted at the upper loading plate, it is
considered that the sample was sheared almost under the
constant water content condition (Fredlund and Rahardjo,
1993; Tsuchida et al., 2011).Figs. 14(a) and 14(b) show the result of the direct shear test
of black soil and brown soil, respectively, in which the
frictional angle and the cohesion at the peak and the residual
condition were plotted. The apparent frictional angle in drained
condition ϕd and apparent cohesion in drained condition cd are
shown in Fig. 14. The values of ϕd and cd at peak strength
were 36.4–37.11 and 7.4–13.4 kPa, respectively, and the
values of ϕd and cd at the residual condition were 35.7–
36.41and 4.9–11.0 kPa, respectively.
It was considered that as collapsed ﬁll was just piled up
without any controlled compaction, the safety of the ﬁll would
be determined by the weak part. Therefore, taking the lowest
values of the result of shear test, the strength parameters of the
collapsed ﬁll for stability analysis were determined as ϕd¼351
and cd¼5.0 kN/m2. Tsuchida et al. (2011) proposed the
following equations for estimating ϕd and cd from the
penetration resistance qd obtained by LWDCPT.
ϕd ¼ 29:9þ1:61 lnðqd5Þþ0:142Sr ð2Þ
cd ¼ 10:6þ1:19 lnðqd5Þ0:041Sr ð3Þ
qd5 ¼ qd0:01 ðγtz5Þ ð4Þ
where qd5 the corrected penetration resistance at the over-
burden pressure is 5 kPa. Using the qd shown in Fig. 12, the
T. Tsuchida et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 621–638 631average qd value at point m-9, non-collapsed ﬁll at 0–1 m
depth was about 1.75 and the measured degree of saturation
was 60.4%. The strength parameter calculated by Eqs. (2)–(4)
were ϕd==39.11 and cd=8.7 kPa, which were slightly larger
than the results of direct shear of remolded samples with the
same void ratio as that of the site.
5. Rainfall and groundwater
5.1. Record of rainfall
Hiroshima Prefecture government has installed an on-line
rainfall measurement system covering 277 measurement sta-
tions in the prefecture. Fig. 15 shows the location of rain
gauges in the vicinity of the disaster area. Fig. 16(a) and (b)
and Fig. 17(a) and (b) show the accumulated rainfall and
hourly rainfall from June 27th to July 31st and from July 24th
to 25th at the rain gauges of Shino Station and Zouga Station,
respectively. In Shino Station, the accumulated rainfall fromFig. 14. Shear strength of collapsed construction surplus soil obt
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Rainfall intensity 23mm/h
Railroad Sanyo 
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Fig. 15. Observation sites of rainJuly 23rd was 151 mm and the maximum rainfall intensity per
hour was 32 mm/h, and in Zouga Point the accumulated
rainfall was 173 mm and the maximum rainfall intensity per
hour was 37 mm/h. The collapse took place at 5:30 am of July
25th 2–3 h after strong rainfall from 21:00 pm on the 24th to
3:00 am on the 25th. This suggests that the cause of collapse
might be related not only to the rainfall but also the under-
ground water which ﬂowed into the slope through the river bed
deposits below the slope since it would take some time for the
water in the catchment area to ﬂow into the ﬁll.
As shown in Figs. 16 and 17, there was continuous
seasonal rainfall from June 29th to July 2nd, from July 8th
to the 10th, and from July 17th to the 21st before the
collapse, and the accumulate rainfall from June 29th
reached 600 mm in less than 1 month, the maximum
accumulative rainfall from the start of a series of rainfalls
since 1999. Accordingly, the water content of the soil near
the collapsed slope was increased by the earlier rainfalls,
making the potential risk of slope failure higher.ained by direct shear test, (a) Black soil and (b) Brown soil.
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Fig. 17. (a) Rainfall intensity and accumulative rainfall at Zouga station from June 27th to July 31st and (b) Rainfall intensity and accumulative rainfall at Zouga
station from July 24th to 25th.
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From a ﬁeld investigation and boring at the top of the
collapse ﬁll, it was known that there is a river bed deposits
layer below the ﬁll of surplus soil. The river bed deposits layerwas considered to be deposited in the past mudﬂow in this
valley, and consists of coarse grained soil classiﬁed into rock
or gravel. Because the permeability of the river bed deposits
layer is rather high and the water ﬂow in this layer was
observed in the ﬁeld investigation on 7th August, 2 weeks after
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Fig. 20. Observation of Ground water Table (September 4th–September
5th, 2009).
T. Tsuchida et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 621–638 633the collapse, it was estimated that groundwater ﬂow would
have been provided to the layer in the case of strong rainfall.
To investigate the groundwater ﬂow in the collapsed ﬁll, a
boring was carried out at the top of the ﬁll (the location is
shown in Fig. 11), and the measurement of the groundwater
level was carried out from August 25th to the end of October,
utilizing the bore hole. Fig. 18 shows the STP-N value–depth
relationship of the bore hole. From the SPT and the bore hole
logs shown in Fig. 18, the thickness of the ﬁll by the surplus
soil was about 9 m and there was a river bed deposit layer of
4 m thickness below the ﬁll.
Fig. 19 shows the measured groundwater level and the rainfall
intensity per hour at the Shino, Shiwa and Higashi-Hiroshima
Stations. As shown in the ﬁgure, a signiﬁcant rise of groundwater
level was measured twice during the observation period. One was
on September 4th and the other was on October 2nd. Fig. 20
shows the relationship between rainfall and the change in the-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
0 10 20 30 40 50
D
ep
th
 (m
)
SPT-N Value
Rhyulite Rock
Fill  by surplus 
soils ( from 
bore hole logs)
Riverbed 
deposits (from 
bore hole logs)
Fig. 18. SPT-N value and river bed deposits below the collapsed ﬁll.
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Fig. 21. Observation of Ground water Table (October 2nd–October 3rd, 2009).groundwater level on September 4th. As shown in the ﬁgure,
although the rainfall period was short, the groundwater level rose
quickly and peaked at about 2 h after the rainfall stopped. Less rain
fell on September 4th than on October 2nd, according to the rise in
groundwater levels. Though the reason remains unclear, it may be
that the local rain at the site was larger than the observed rainfalls.
Fig. 21 shows the relationship between rainfall and the change in
the groundwater level on October 2nd. As shown in the ﬁgures, the
rainfall intensity per hour showed two or three peaks, while the
groundwater level showed two peaks several hours after the rainfall
peak. These records suggest that the groundwater in the ﬁll rises
several hours later after the rainfall due to the supply of water from
the catchment, and that the rise in the groundwater level in the ﬁll
due to the supply of groundwater was a major cause of the disaster.6. Slope stability analyses
6.1. Strength parameter of soil
A two dimensional slope stability analysis was carried out
by circular slip with slices in order to understand the causative
T. Tsuchida et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 621–638634mechanism of the collapse of the ﬁll. A computer program for
the circular slip was used to search for the minimum safety
factor. The calculation method employed was Fellenius's
method, because it is this method that is adopted in the
technical standards for infrastructures, such as highway
bridges, riverdikes and dams.
The cross sections for analyses were constructed from the
restored historical change of cross section shown in Fig. 9.
Fig. 22 shows the estimated cross section just before the
collapse. As mentioned before, it was known from the analysis
of aerial photograph and the survey that the collapse took place
in the ﬁll after 1992, which was above the ground surface in
1992 in Fig. 8. “Filling after 1992” in Fig. 22 consists of the
embankment, which was constructed for road of industrial
waste disposal site before 1999 and the ﬁll made by surplus
soil after 2004. However, as it was difﬁcult to discriminate the
embankment and the ﬁll from the qd-depth relationship, the
same strength parameters were used in the stability analysis.0 20 40 60 80 10
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Table 3
Strength properties of layer.
Layer Wet unit weight
γt (kN/m
3)
Saturated unit weight
γsat (kN/m
3)
Internal fri
ϕ (deg)
a. Bed rock 24.0 24.0 40.0
b. Old Talus 21.0 21.0 40.0
c. River bed deposits 20.0 21.0 40.0
d. Filling before 1992 20.0 21.0 40.0
e. Filling after 1992 18.2 19.2 35.0
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Fig. 23. Cross section of slope at collapse and theTable 3 shows the list of the parameters used in the stability
analysis, where the parameters for the bed rock, old talus, river
bed deposits and embankment before 1992 were determined
after referring to the documents for design ( Nishi-Nippon
Express Highway, 2007, 2008). According to Tsuchida et al.
(2011), the apparent frictional angle of Masado is not affected
by the degree of saturation, while the apparent cohesion is
reduced by the increase of degree of saturation due to the loss
of suction. As the apparent cohesion, 5 kPa of “ﬁlling after
1992” was obtained when the Sr was 70%, the reduction due to
the increase of Sr should be taken into consideration. However,
considering that the soil sample was reconstituted in the
laboratory and the difference between the values estimated
by LWDCPT, the reduction of cohesion was not considered in
the analysis. The cohesion of 5 kPa for “ﬁlling after 1992” was
smaller than the cohesion of 10 kPa “ﬁlling before 1992”. The
cohesion of 10 kPa and ϕd of 40.01 were taken from the design
manual of Nishi-Nippon Express Highway (Nishi-Nippon0 120 140 160 180 200
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ﬁlls which were constructed with the usual manner. As it was
estimated the ﬁlling before 1992 were made as part of a
construction work of the forest road, the above strength
parameters were used. The ﬁlling after 1992 was mainly for
the purpose of disposing of surplus soil and no controlled
compaction was carried out. The difference between the ﬁlling
before 1992 and after 1992 was due to the construction
method.6.2. Stability analysis for the ordinary groundwater level
It is considered that in ordinary rainfall conditions, the
groundwater ﬂows in the river bed deposits layer. For the
ordinary condition of groundwater, a slope stability analysis
was carried out for the cross section before the collapse.
Considering the shape of the sliding surface based on the
measured ground surface, both a circle sliding surface and a
coupled sliding surface consisting of a circle and a straight line
are assumed. Fig. 23 showed the result of the analysis, where
the minimum safety factor 1.491 was obtained at the top of the
ﬁll, and in the case of coupled sliding surface, the minimum
safety factor was 1.600. It can be said that the ﬁll was safe
enough when the groundwater level was in the river bed
deposits. From Fig. 23, it can be seen that the spring water, as
observed after the collapse (Photo 5), was located much higher
than the ordinary level of groundwater.0
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Fig. 24. Relationship between ground water level and safety factor calculated
by the coupled slide method.
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Fig. 25. Safety factor of collapsed slope wh6.3. Slope stability analysis at the rise of groundwater level
The safety factors for a coupled sliding surface were
calculated assuming the rise of groundwater level, which was
made by the supply of groundwater through the river bed
deposits layer. Fig. 24 shows the relationship between the
assumed rise of the groundwater level and the safety factor.
Here the groundwater level is assumed to simply have risen
parallel to the ordinary level, although the groundwater level at
the toe of ﬁlling inﬂuences the shape of the sliding surface. As
shown in the ﬁgure, when the groundwater level rose by 9 m,
the safety factor became less than 1.0. The rise of 9 m was
coincident with the evidence of spring water from the ﬁll
shown in Photo 5, taken during the ﬁeld investigation.
Fig. 25 showed the sliding surfaces with both circular slip
and coupled sliding surfaces, assuming a 9 m rise in the
groundwater. As shown in the ﬁgure, the safety factors for a
large scale slide were 0.935 for the circular slip and 0.966 for
the coupled sliding surface, respectively. The pursued mini-
mum safety factor with circular slip was 0.476 at the foot of
the ﬁll, which means that the small scale slide took place at the
foot and the failure of the ﬁll occurred progressively from the
foot to the top of ﬁll.
6.4. Slope stability analysis at the rise of groundwater level
without ﬁll for 2004–2009
Fig. 26 shows the results of slope stability analysis assuming
that there is no ﬁll by surplus soils for 2004–2009 under the
condition of 9 m rise of groundwater level. The minimum safety
factor for coupled sliding surface is 1.166, meaning that the
large scale slide would not occur without any ﬁll for 2004–
2009. Chasing the minimum safety factor by the circular slip
method, a small sliding surface at the middle of the slope shows
the safety factor 0.916 as shown in Fig. 26, meaning that the
small scale sliding near ground surface would take place.
However, considering that the safety factor is 0.916 and the
sliding was shallow and small scale, it is reasonable to assume
that the sliding would have stopped after the balance was
recovered by a small movement of soil mass and not proceeded
to large scale collapse. The stability analysis shows that the
surplus soil added between 2004 and 2009 had steepened thel Distance (m)
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Fig. 26. Stability analysis in the case without the ﬁlling after 2004 (rise of ground water table is 9 m).
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time of heavy rain much smaller.
7. Results and discussions
Considering the results of ﬁeld investigation, the reconstruc-
tion of the land-forming process from the aerial photographs
and measurements, the stability analysis, the causes and the
mechanism of the collapse of the ﬁll and the long-distance
ﬂow of the collapse soils are summarized as follows:
Permeable layer with a large area of catchment: The ﬁlling
for construction of the waste disposal site and the ﬁlling by the
surplus soils had been made on the river bed deposits. River
bed deposits consisting of coarse sands, gravels and cobbles
are well permeable layer and have a large catchment topo-
graphically. The relationship between the rainfall and the rise
of groundwater table was suggested by comparing the mea-
sured groundwater level with the observed rainfall near the site
after the collapse.
Heavy and continued rainfall: The accumulated rainfall in
July 2009 at Shino and Zouga Stations were 481 mm and
545 mm, respectively, which was the largest since 1999, the
year of 6.29 disaster. Due to the intermittent rainfall at the site
of disaster for almost 1 month, it was estimated that the degree
of saturation of the collapsed ﬁll and the surrounding slopes in
the catchment was increased. Due to the heavy rainfall on the
24th of July, a large amount of groundwater was supplied to
the ﬁll, making the level of ground water rise by as much as
about 9 m from its ordinary height.
Expansion of ﬁll by surplus soils after 2004 without any
consideration for geotechnical safety: Since 2004, a large
volume of construction surplus soil accepted for a fee by a
company was added to the existing ﬁll, expanding the steep
slope, and without any installation of drainage facilities. The
results of slope stability analysis showed that a large scale slide
would not have occurred without the addition to the ﬁll
between 2004 and 2009, even if the level of groundwater
had risen by 9 m from its ordinary level.
Mechanism of collapse: When the ground water level was in
the river bed deposits as the ordinary condition, the minimum
safety factor of the slope was about 1.5. Due to the heavy rain
and the groundwater supplied from the catchment, the ground
water level in the ﬁll rose and the safety factor was reduced.The collapse took place from the foot of the slope and
progressed to the top of the slope, rinsing the groundwater
level. When the height of the ground water was about 9 m
higher than its ordinary level, large scale sliding took place. It
should be noted that if drainage facilities had been installed in
the ﬁll, the collapse might have been avoided by preventing
the rise of the ground water level.
Long distance ﬂow of collapsed soil: From the ﬁeld
investigation, the collapsed soil soon ﬁlled the inside space
of the retaining wall which had been constructed as a facility of
the waste disposal site, and ﬂowed out over the wall. The
surface of the accumulated soil inside the retaining wall was
ﬂat, (a 3-degree inclination), showing that the collapsed soil
was almost ﬂuidized with no frictional resistance. It is
considered that a large volume of water was supplied through
the river bed deposits, as well as from rainfall, will result in a
high water content of collapse soils, making it possible for
them to have long distance ﬂow movement.
Insufﬁcient government control: Hiroshima Prefectural Gov-
ernment had an ordinance to control the disposal sites of
surplus soils. According to the ordinance, any company
managing a disposal site larger than 2000 m2 must notify the
appropriate government ofﬁce, and report the nature of its
business and the speciﬁcations of the disposal site, so that the
government could monitor the safety of the site. However, as
the area of the site before the disaster was slightly less than
2000 m2, no legal regulation was applied to the site. As a
result, the topographical change of the ﬁlling was left
uncontrolled before the occurrence of the fatal disaster.
Considering that most of the surplus soil disposal sites in
Hiroshima Prefecture are located in mountainous areas, the
limit to areas of 2000 m2 plus was too lax from a geotechnical
point of view. After this disaster, Hiroshima Prefectural
Government published and enforced the technical requirements
on safety measures to all the administrators of disposal sites of
surplus soil and strengthened the system of surveillance.
8. Conclusions
The collapse of a slope occurred due to heavy rain in
Higashi-Hiroshima City's Shiwa District at about 5:30 am July
25th, 2009. The slope was made of surplus soils, and it
contained a mass of water supplied from rainfall and ground
T. Tsuchida et al. / Soils and Foundations 54 (2014) 621–638 637water ﬂow of a permeable layer at the bottom. The collapsed
soil was ﬂuidized and ﬂowed downstream and destroyed a
house. The disaster is the ﬁrst case in Japan of a disposal site
for surplus soil collapsing due to heavy rainfall and resulting in
a fatal accident. After the event, a detailed investigation was
conducted of this failure in order to ﬁnd the cause and
mechanism of the failure. From the ﬁeld studies, laboratory
soil tests, slope stability analysis and the laboratory model
tests, the following conclusions were obtained:1) The collapsed ﬁll was the disposal site of surplus soil, located
in a valley. As the company managing the site did not have
sufﬁcient records of the accepted soil or for the process of
ﬁlling, there was almost no available data on the collapsed
ﬁll. To reconstruct the shape of the ﬁll before the collapse,
the history of the geographical changes was analyzed by
using old map, image processing of aerial photographs, 3-
dimentional laser survey after the collapse and the measure-
ment of thickness of collapsed soils by a dynamic cone
penetration test. It was known that the ﬁll expanded by the
ﬁlling of surplus soil after 2004 and the estimated volume of
ﬁlls of surplus soil was 7000 m3. In the ﬁlling, no drainage
facility was installed and no compaction was made.2) Downstream from the collapsed ﬁll, there were rubber
sheets which were laid for the unused waste disposal site.
By the geotechnical investigation with the lightweight
penetration test, it was found that no sliding or movement
of the collapsed soil took place at the surface of the rubber
sheet and the rubber sheets were not related to the disaster.3) The ﬁlling for construction of the waste disposal site and the
ﬁlling by the surplus soils had been made on the river bed
deposits layer, consisting of coarse sands, gravels and cobble-
stones. The river bed deposits layer have a large catchment
topographically, and it was conﬁrmed that the height of
groundwater table rose several hours later after the strong
rainfall by observation using a bore hole at the top of the ﬁlling.4) Due to the intermittent rainfall at the site of disaster for
almost 1 month, it was estimated that the degree of
saturation of the collapsed ﬁll and the surrounding slopes
in the catchment increased. Due to the heavy rainfall on the
24th of July, a large amount of groundwater was supplied to
the ﬁlling. Judging from the location of spring water
observed in the ﬁeld investigation after the collapse, the
level of ground water had risen by as much as about 9 m.5) The collapsed soil ﬁlled the inside of the retaining wall which
had been constructed as a facility of waste disposal site shortly,
ﬂowed out over the retaining wall and ﬁnally reached a house
located 500 m downstream from the ﬁll, and destroyed it
completely. The collapsed soil was almost ﬂuidized and had no
frictional resistance. It is considered that the supply of the large
volume of water through the river bed deposits, as well as the
rainfall, results in a high water content of collapsed soils, and
consequently long distance ﬂow movement.6) When the ground water level was within the river bed
deposits, the minimum safety factor of the slope was about
1.5. Due to the heavy rain and the groundwater supplied
from the catchment, the ground water level in the ﬁll roseand the safety factor was reduced. The collapse took place
from the foot of the slope and progressed to the top of the
slope with rinsing of the groundwater level. When the level
of ground water reached to about 9 m higher than the
ordinary level which is the top of the river bed deposits, a
large scale sliding took place. The rise of 9 m was
coincided with occurrence of spring waters observed in
the ﬁeld investigation.7) A large volume of construction surplus soil was ﬁlled on
the existing ﬁll since 2004, making the expanded steep
slope. The ﬁlling had been carried out without the installa-
tion of drainage facilities. The results of slope stability
analysis showed that no large scale slide would have
occured had nothing been added to the ﬁll between 2004
and 2009, even if the level of groundwater had risen by 9 m
from its ordinary level..8) The disaster was the ﬁrst case in Japan that the disposal site
for surplus soil collapsed due to the heavy rainfall and
resulted in a fatal accident. The geographical shape of slope
before failure made this problem worse, and the volume of
the collapsed soil was unclear and no records of the
disposals were kept due to poor management. In this study,
the mechanism of failure could be explained by use of
image processing of aerial photographs, ﬁeld tests by
dynamic cone penetration test and the measurement of
groundwater level – rainfall relation after the failure. It
seems that these techniques used in this study are available
for investigation of natural slope disasters.9) One of the causes of the disaster was that in Hiroshima
Prefecture's ordinance to control the disposal sites of
surplus soils, only sites with an area of more than
2000 m2 were covered, and no legal regulation was applied
to the site less than 2000 m2. Considering that, the most of
disposal sites of surplus soil locate in the mountainous area,
the ordinance was not sufﬁcient from a geotechnical point
of view. After this disaster, Hiroshima Prefectural Govern-
ment published and enforced the technical requirements on
safety measures to all the administrators of disposal sites of
surplus soil and strengthened the system of surveillance.
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